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Note
DRAWING THE LINE: A FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
FOR PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING IN THE WAKE OF
RUCHO V. COMMON CAUSE
KYLE KERAGA*
Gerrymandering is extremely effective. In 2011, Maryland Democrats
drew a district map restricting Republicans to only one of eight congressional
seats, despite the Republican Party’s consistent thirty-five percent share of
the statewide popular vote. 1 In 2016, North Carolina Republicans
consolidated their advantage with a map confining Democrats to three of ten
seats, despite the Democratic Party’s forty-five percent share of the vote. 2 In
each subsequent election, these plans have worked precisely as intended,
entrenching the mapmakers’ control of their state legislatures despite spirited
challenges from their state’s minority party. 3 This problem is not unique to
Maryland or North Carolina: Since the 2010 redistricting cycle, as many as
fifty-nine seats in the House of Representatives have been predetermined,
election-to-election, by partisan gerrymanders—twenty in favor of
Democrats, and thirty-nine in favor of Republicans. 4
Democracy is not supposed to work this way—and the voting public
broadly agrees: Gerrymandering, “the drawing of legislative district lines to
subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party in
power,” is the subject of widespread, bipartisan opposition. 5 Contempt for
© 2020 Kyle Keraga
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author would first like to thank the staff of the Maryland Law Review, particularly Trevor
Hoffberger, Bianca Spinosa, Gina Bohannon, Jack Karpinski, and Lauren Fash, for their diligent
editorial work. The author would also like to sincerely thank his faculty advisor, Professor Richard
Boldt, for his comprehensive feedback and brilliant insights, and for the enjoyable collaboration he
provided throughout the research and writing process. Finally, the author wishes to thank his
parents, Gale and Kelvin Keraga, for their boundless love and support, and his partner, Lexi
Rindone, for her thoughtful insights and meaningful conversations, as well as her love, enthusiasm,
and remarkable patience.
1. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2511 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 2510.
3. Id. at 2493, 2510–11.
4. Alex Tausanovitch, The Impact of Partisan Gerrymandering, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Oct. 1, 2019, 9:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/news/2019/10/01/
475166/impact-partisan-gerrymandering/.
5. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015).
As recently as 2017, as many as seventy-three percent of Americans expressed support for removing
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this practice has been a prominent feature of our political culture since the
earliest days of our Republic 6—expressed through political cartoons, art
galleries, and computer fonts. 7 This disdain is well-founded, as partisan
gerrymanders have substantial suppressive effects on public participation:
They chill turnout among minority parties, distort accountability between
voters and their representatives, contribute to ideological segregation among
the electorate, raise the costs of challenging incumbents, and reinforce a
pervasive sentiment that participation in our democracy is an exercise in
futility. 8 Seventeen states have addressed this issue by establishing an
independent redistricting commission through ballot initiatives or legislative
enactments 9; in the remaining thirty-three, disaffected voters are often left to
seek redress through the judiciary.
In Rucho v. Common Cause, 10 the United States Supreme Court
declared that partisan gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question

partisanship from the districting process entirely, even if it would cost their party an election.
Supermajority of Americans Want Supreme Court to Limit Partisan Gerrymandering, CAMPAIGN
LEGAL CTR. (Sept. 11, 2017), https://campaignlegal.org/press-releases/supermajority-americanswant-supreme-court-limit-partisan-gerrymandering/.
6. Anna Khomina, Elbridge Gerry and the Original Gerrymander, GILDER LEHRMAN INST.
AM. HIST. (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.gilderlehrman.org/blog/elbridge-gerry-and-originalgerrymander/ (describing contemporary disdain for Elbridge Gerry’s original gerrymander).
7. E.g., Harlow G. Unger, Elbridge Gerry’s Monster Salamander that Swallows Votes, HIST.
NEWS NETWORK (Nov. 3 2019), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/173464 (showcasing
classic Boston Centinal political cartoon that coined the term “gerrymander”); “Redistricting” –
City Hall’s New Art Exhibit, LANCASTER PUB. ART (Oct. 30, 2019),
https://www.lancasterpublicart.com/news/2019/10/30/redistricting-city-halls-new-art-exhibit/
(encouraging viewers to treat congressional districts as Rorschach ink blot tests); Grace Panetta,
There’s a New Downloadable Font Inspired by Gerrymandered Congressional Districts, BUS.
INSIDER (Aug. 1, 2019, 1:25 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/you-can-download-fontgerrymandered-congressional-districts-2019-8/ (providing a moderately legible typeface
constructed entirely of congressional districts).
8. See Danny Hayes & Seth C. McKee, The Participatory Effects of Redistricting, 53 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 1006, 1008–09 (2009) (reviewing effects on turnout and incumbency costs); Fred Dews,
A Primer on Gerrymandering and Political Polarization, BROOKINGS INST. (July 6, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/07/06/a-primer-on-gerrymandering-andpolitical-polarization/ (discussing polarization and ideological segregation); Sam Fleming, Battle
Lines: The Fight for a Fair Vote in America, FT MAG (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/gerrymandering (highlighting widespread voter frustration and electoral
futility); Thomas E. Mann, We Must Address Gerrymandering, TIME (Oct. 13, 2016),
https://time.com/4527291/2016-election-gerrymandering/ (observing “hyper-partisanship that
paralyzes our politics and governance”).
9. Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr.
18, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-commissions-congressionalplans.aspx. Eight states have delegated redistricting authority to an independent commission, while
eight others have a commission that works alongside the legislature. Id. Iowa follows a unique
system that leaves the task up to nonpartisan legislative staff, with a final legislative vote of
approval. Id.
10. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
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beyond the authority of the federal courts. 11 The Court reached this
conclusion despite a longstanding acknowledgement that extreme
gerrymandering is “incompatible with [our] democratic principles” 12—over
the years, assorted Justices from both parties have criticized gerrymandering
as everything from “cherry-pick[ing] voters,” 13 to “rigging elections,” 14 to a
subversion of “the core principle of republican government . . . that the voters
should choose their representatives, not the other way around.” 15 With the
doors of the federal courts closed, voters seeking to challenge their political
disempowerment will be left to seek relief from the state courts, or from the
gerrymanderers themselves. 16
This result may have been predictable, but it was also avoidable. From
the outset, the development of gerrymandering doctrine was hindered by the
Court’s decision to accept partisan dominance as a permissible motive, and
to frame its analysis around the impact of a map on future elections. 17
Instead, the Court should have drawn the line at intent. This Note challenges
the Court’s insistence on an effects-based jurisprudence by arguing that a
map drawn with the predominant purpose of securing partisan advantage is a
form of viewpoint discrimination and a violation of the political participatory
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. 18 Properly adjudicated under a
manageable standard grounded in intent, extreme partisan gerrymanders like
those in Maryland and North Carolina are a clear constitutional violation, and
cannot be a political question. 19

11. See infra Part III.
12. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)).
13. Id. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
14. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
15. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2677 (quoting Mitchell N. Berman, Managing
Gerrymandering, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 781, 781 (2005)).
16. See Gretchen Frazee & Laura Santhanam, What the Supreme Court’s Gerrymandering
Decision
Means
for
2020,
PBS
(June
28,
2019,
5:51
PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/what-the-supreme-courts-gerrymandering-decision-meansfor-2020 (discussing how redistricting has become a focal point in “state-level fights for political
power” following the 2010 election); Michael Wines, State Court Bars Using North Carolina House
TIMES
(Oct.
28,
2019),
Map
in
2020
Elections,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/us/north-carolina-gerrymander-maps.html (revealing how a
North Carolina Superior Court struck down the map at issue in Rucho under a state constitutional
provision).
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part IV.D.
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I. THE CASE
Rucho v. Common Cause featured parallel challenges to congressional
district maps drawn by the Maryland and North Carolina legislatures. 20 Each
map was designed to consolidate the congressional advantage of each state’s
majority party: In Maryland, the map favored Democrats, while in North
Carolina, the map favored Republicans. 21 Each map performed exactly as
intended, reinforcing each party’s control over its state’s congressional
delegation in subsequent elections. 22 In response, voters and public interest
organizations challenged each map under the First Amendment, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Elections Clause, and
Article I, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. 23 In both cases, the plaintiffs
prevailed, the maps were enjoined, and the defendants appealed. 24
Common Cause v. Rucho 25 featured a challenge to North Carolina’s
2016 Congressional Redistricting Plan (the “2016 Plan”). 26 After two
elections in which Republicans secured at least seventy-five percent of the
state’s Congressional seats despite earning at most fifty-five percent of the
popular vote, 27 North Carolina Representative David Lewis and Senator
Robert Rucho, co-chairs of the Assembly’s redistricting committee, hired a
Republican specialist to draw a map that would maintain the Republican
Party’s 10-3 advantage in the state’s Congressional delegation. 28 This
process was openly partisan: The redistricting committee listed “Partisan
Advantage” as a guiding criterion in the map-drawing process. 29
Representative Lewis “acknowledge[d] freely that this would be a political
gerrymander,” and optimized the map for a 10-3 Republican advantage only
“because he did not believe it [would be] possible to draw a map with 11
Republicans and 2 Democrats.” 30 Adopted on party lines, the map solidified

20. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019).
21. Id. at 2491, 2493.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2491. Article I Section 2 provides that representatives “shall be apportioned among
the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
24. Id.
25. 318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D.N.C. 2018), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
26. Id. at 799.
27. Id. at 804.
28. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2510 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The specialist, Dr. Thomas Hofeller,
employed “sophisticated technological tools and precinct-level election results . . . to predict voting
behavior.” Id.
29. Id.
30. Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 808 (alterations in original). Representative Lewis
further proclaimed, “I think electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats. So I drew this
map to help foster what I think is better for the country.” Id. at 809.
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the Republican Party’s advantage in 2016 and 2018, despite a dwindling
popular vote lead. 31
Benisek v. Lamone 32 presented the same issue along inverted party
lines. 33 In 2011, Maryland Democrats aggressively pursued a redistricting
plan that would create a 7-1 advantage in Congress, despite the party’s
election share peaking at sixty-five percent. 34 Maryland Senate President
Thomas V. Mike Miller, Jr., characterized this gerrymander as a “serious
obligation” to counteract the Republican Party’s nationwide redistricting
efforts. 35 According to former Governor Martin O’Malley, the map was
calibrated to flip the Sixth Congressional District into Democratic control.36
The Democrat-led redistricting committee hired Eric Hawkins, an analyst at
a Democratic consulting firm, “to ensure that the new map produced 7
reliable Democratic seats, and to protect all Democratic incumbents.” 37 To
achieve this goal, Hawkins moved approximately 360,000 voters out of the
district, and moved 350,000 new voters in—reducing the population of
registered Republicans by over 66,000 while increasing the number of
Democrats by 24,000. 38 Following this map’s adoption—also on party
lines—the Sixth District has remained firmly Democratic. 39
The United States District Courts for the District of Maryland and the
Middle District of North Carolina primarily adjudicated these claims under
the First Amendment. 40 Each court synthesized the Supreme Court’s
viewpoint discrimination precedent 41 to distill roughly equivalent threeprong tests, requiring: (1) an invidious intent to discriminate against the
disfavored party, (2) a discriminatory impact on that party, and (3) a causal

31. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2510 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
32. 348 F. Supp. 3d 493 (D. Md. 2018), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
33. Id. at 497.
34. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2511 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
35. Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 506.
36. Id. at 502.
37. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2511 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 2493 (majority opinion).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2492–93. The Common Cause Court also ruled on Equal Protection grounds. Id. at
2492. Under the Common Cause Equal Protection test, plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) “that a
legislative mapdrawer’s predominant purpose . . . was to ‘subordinate adherents of one political
party and entrench a rival party in power’”; and (2) “that the dilution of the votes of supporters of a
disfavored party . . . is likely to persist in subsequent elections such that an elected representative
from the favored party in the district will not feel a need to be responsive to constituents who support
the disfavored party.” Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 864, 867 (M.D.N.C. 2018)
(quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658
(2015)), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
41. See infra Section II.A.3.

2020]

DRAWING THE LINE

803

connection between intent and effect. 42 Through this analysis, a map’s
discriminatory impact could be expressed either as an injury to the plaintiff’s
representational rights on a theory of vote dilution, or an associational injury
by virtue of a chilling effect on the political activities of the disfavored
party. 43
Applying this test to an extensive array of direct 44 and circumstantial 45
evidence, both courts ruled for the plaintiffs and enjoined the challenged
district maps. 46 The courts found that the plaintiffs had successfully stated a
representational injury by demonstrating that their natural political strength
was diluted through the “widespread cracking and packing” 47 of their party’s
votes. 48 The Benisek court held that the Maryland plaintiffs had also suffered
an associational injury, as residents of the Sixth District “were burdened in
fundraising, attracting volunteers, campaigning, and generating interest in
voting in an atmosphere of general confusion and apathy.” 49 Both sets of
defendants appealed directly to the Supreme Court under Title 28, section
1253 of the United States Code. 50

42. Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 515 (D. Md. 2018), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484
(2019); Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 929.
43. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2502–03; Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 517, 522; Common Cause, 318
F. Supp. 3d at 840, 858.
44. Among other evidence, the plaintiffs in Common Cause and Benisek demonstrated
legislative intent by pointing to clear statements by legislators and party officials involved with the
redistricting process. Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 803; Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 502,
506. Each party made efforts to limit the minority’s involvement in the mapmaking process and
engaged in private talks with partisan consultants.; Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 803; Benisek,
348 F. Supp. 3d at 502, 504–05. Testimony demonstrated that these consultants relied heavily on
voter data and were instructed to draw a partisan map. Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 803;
Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 502–03.
45. Each case relied on different forms of circumstantial evidence to demonstrate the
challenged maps’ extreme partisan lean. See Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 500–01, 507 (noting
historic swing in the Sixth District’s “Partisan Voter Index” and reshuffling of voters); Common
Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 896–97 (comparing North Carolina map to thousands of hypothetical
alternatives generated by plaintiffs’ expert, nonprofit organizations, and a bipartisan panel of
judges).
46. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491.
47. Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 884. Cracking involves spreading members of a
disfavored group across multiple districts to dilute their voting strength; packing entails
concentrating members of that group into a limited number of districts to minimize the effect of
individual votes. Id. at 811.
48. Id. at 884.
49. Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 524.
50. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491. Under Title 28, section 2284(a) of the United States Code, “[a]
district court of three judges shall be convened . . . when an action is filed challenging the
constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2012). A
losing party may appeal the grant of an injunction issued by a three-judge panel directly to the
Supreme Court. Id. § 1253.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court’s holding in Rucho v. Common Cause was the
culmination of a decades-long struggle to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering
claims. 51 Understanding the heart of that quagmire and the basis of the Rucho
opinion requires a broad look at the Court’s interpretation of its power of
review. Section II.A explores the way separation of powers limits the scope
of judicial authority. 52 Section II.B discusses how these principles have been
applied to shape the Court’s redistricting jurisprudence. 53
A. Justiciability and the Scope of Judicial Review
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases or controversies arising under the
laws of the United States.54 Cognizant of the counter-majoritarian concerns
associated with overreach by an unelected judiciary, the Supreme Court has
construed this language to constrain the realm of disputes within the scope of
judicial review. 55 Justiciability doctrines such as ripeness, standing, and
mootness function as procedural and temporal limitations on the judicial
role. 56 Comparatively, nonjusticiable political questions are substantive
matters entirely beyond the authority of the federal courts, often by virtue of
their commitment to a coordinate branch of government. 57
These doctrines—political question among them—are characterized by
a continuing tension between judicial respect for the political process and the
judicial role as a check on democratic decisionmaking. 58 Section II.A.1
discusses how the political question doctrine has been used to balance these
competing concepts as an implementation of the separation of powers. 59
Section II.A.2 reviews how these same conceptual foundations undergird a
rubric for heightened scrutiny of laws that harm the majoritarian democratic
process. 60 Section II.A.3 provides a proof of concept for this framework by
51. See infra Section II.B.2.
52. See infra Section II.A.
53. See infra Section II.B.
54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
55. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1968) (finding the words “case” and “controversy”
“limit the business of federal courts to questions . . . capable of resolution through the judicial
process” and “define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power”).
56. Id. at 95.
57. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454–55 (1939) (referencing “the appropriateness under
our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also
the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination” as “dominant considerations” in the
justiciability of a substantive legal issue).
58. See id.
59. See infra Section II.A.1
60. See infra Section II.A.2.
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illustrating the Court’s history of intervention to restrain legislative and
executive decisions with a deleterious impact on state elections.61
1. The Separation of Powers: Origin and Application of the Political
Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine constrains the power of judicial review
by protecting the policymaking prerogative of the democratically elected
branches. 62 The notion that some policy decisions are not suitable for judicial
redress can be traced back to the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court. 63
In Marbury v. Madison, 64 Justice Marshall recognized that the discretionary
exercise of executive power is not subject to judicial oversight.65
Comparatively, a President’s ministerial duty to comply with a statutory or
constitutional mandate may be subject to review. 66 Additionally, the Court
has traditionally held that the Constitution’s guaranty of “a Republican Form
of Government” 67 is the exclusive province of the political branches.68 Any
judicial evaluation of the legitimacy of a state government would necessarily
require subjective policy determinations by unelected judges, with sweeping
implications for the allocation of a state’s political power. 69
The modern formulation of this doctrine emerged in Baker v. Carr, 70
when the Supreme Court evaluated the justiciability of an Equal Protection

61. See infra Section II.A.3.
62. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)
(characterizing the political question doctrine as excluding from review “policy choices and value
determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of
the Executive Branch”).
63. E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803); Hylton v. United States, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173–75 (1796).
64. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
65. Id. at 165–66 (“By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with
certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is
accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience. . . . [W]hatever
opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there
exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion.”).
66. Id at 166. (“[W]hen the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties . . . he is
so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion
sport away the vested rights of others.”).
67. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government.”).
68. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
69. Id. at 41–42 (finding “it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established
one in a State”; noting “[I]ts decision is binding on every other department of the government, and
could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal”; and questioning the standard by which a court could
evaluate this decision).
70. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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challenge to Tennessee’s legislative district plan. 71 The Baker Court first
evaluated traditionally nonreviewable powers, including foreign relations, 72
recognition of foreign and tribal governments, 73 the duration of wartime
hostilities, 74 and the validity of constitutional amendments.75 Synthesizing
these concepts, and finding the case justiciable, the Court reasoned that “[t]he
nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the
separation of powers.” 76 Prominent among political questions are several
features, including “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department,” and “a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” 77 When a case is
characterized by one or more of these patterns, judicial intervention would
likely implicate separation of powers, and the Court should decline to
exercise its power of review. 78
Nevertheless, the presence of a political question turns on the unique
circumstances of each case. 79 As “deference rests on reason, not habit,” the
Court will intervene if the facts clearly demonstrate that a government actor
has exceeded the scope of its authority. 80 The Court has declined to review
matters of impeachment, a power granted exclusively to the Senate, 81 and
prudentially refrained from interfering with the organization of the National

71. Id. at 187, 196, 197–98. The Baker plaintiffs alleged that Tennessee’s continued use of an
apportionment plan adopted in 1901 was “unconstitutional and obsolete,” as the state’s population
had grown and shifted dramatically in the half century since that plan was enacted. Id. at 192–94.
72. Id. at 211.
73. Id. at 212, 215.
74. Id. at 213.
75. Id. at 214.
76. Id. at 210.
77. Id. at 217. The full list of political question formulations provided in Baker also includes:
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Id.
78. Cf. id. at 217 (“Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there
should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political question’s presence.”).
79. Id. at 210–11 (noting that “the ‘political question’ label” tends to incorrectly suggest a
categorical analysis and “obscure the need for case-by-case inquiry”).
80. Id. at 213–14; accord Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547 (1924) (“[A] Court
is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends upon
the truth of what is declared.”).
81. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229 (1993) (holding that where Article I, section 3,
grants the Senate “the sole Power to try all Impeachments,” the word “sole” suggests the Senate’s
authority is exclusive).
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Guard, a responsibility vested in Congress. 82 In each case, the lack of
manageable standards suggested that the constitutional commitment in
question was intended to be exclusive, as the issue was not suitable for
judicial resolution. 83 By contrast, in Powell v. McCormack, 84 the Supreme
Court determined that the House of Representatives cannot exclude lawfully
elected members, notwithstanding its constitutional authority to determine
their qualifications under Article I, Section 5. 85 In light “of the basic
principles of our Democratic system,” the Court reasoned that the “textually
demonstrable commitment” of authority embodied by that provision does not
include “a discretionary power to deny membership by a majority vote.” 86
2. The Famous Footnote Four: A Rubric for Heightened Review of
Legislative Actions
The same principles of judicial restraint that animate the political
question doctrine also demand that decisions of the legislature are given
substantial deference by the courts. 87 Even before Marbury, the Court has
frequently attached a presumption of constitutionality to legislative acts.88
When invoking this presumption, the Court construes every possible
inference in favor of a law’s validity and will only intervene where an alleged
constitutional violation is readily apparent. 89 In modern jurisprudence, this
concept has been formalized as the rational basis standard of review—a

82. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1973) (noting that where Article I, section 8, grants
Congress and the States the power to organize and discipline the militia, judicial review “would
therefore embrace critical areas of responsibility vested by the Constitution in the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government”).
83. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–29 (finding the two concepts are not distinct, as “the lack of
judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable
commitment to a coordinate branch”); Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 8 (doubting the “technical competence”
of a judge to engage in the technical evaluation required to review regulations of the armed forces).
84. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
85. Id. at 548.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (“When Congress acts within
its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed
judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.”).
88. E.g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 18 (1800) (“The presumption, indeed, must
always be in favor of the validity of laws, if the contrary is not clearly demonstrated.”); Hylton v.
United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 175 (1796) (declining to overturn tax on carriages absent clear
evidence; holding that acts of Congress should only be overturned as unconstitutional “in a very
clear case”).
89. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Due respect for the decisions of a
coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon
a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.”); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 625 (1819) (“[T]his court has expressed the cautious
circumspection with which it approaches the consideration of such questions; . . . in no doubtful
case, would it pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution.”).
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highly deferential analysis characterized by respect for the policymaking
prerogative of the elected legislature. 90 Rational basis scrutiny operates as a
judicial default, and is applied unless challenged legislation implicates a
fundamental right or a suspect classification. 91
This deference—and its underlying principles of restraint—is set aside
whenever legislative decisions implicate constitutional guaranties.92 The
most famous statement of this principle comes from United States v.
Carolene Products, Co., 93 a commerce clause case featuring a congressional
prohibition on the interstate shipment of filled milk. 94 In a well-cited
footnote of that decision (“Footnote Four”), the Court articulated a
framework for a more exacting standard of judicial review. 95 Although not
exhaustive, the Court provided three predicate circumstances for heightened
scrutiny: (1) laws that appear to violate specific constitutional provisions,
such as Bill of Rights guaranties; (2) restrictions on the majoritarian political
process, such as limitations on the right to vote, the dissemination of
information, or the operation of political organizations; and (3)
discrimination “against discrete and insular minorities”—groups lacking the
ability to defend their interests through the organic operations of the political
process. 96
The principles set forth by Footnote Four have evolved into a framework
for the judicial role, defining when intervention should prevail over restraint
and prudential considerations. In the decades following Carolene Products,
the Court has applied strict scrutiny to strike down laws that discriminate
against suspect classes or interfere with fundamental rights.97 Similarly, the
Court has gradually articulated various degrees of heightened scrutiny to
safeguard the liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 98 Nevertheless, the
90. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[L]egislation . . . is not
to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed
it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within
the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”); accord Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (“[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its
aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might
be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
91. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 191–92 (1964).
92. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
93. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
94. Id. at 145–46.
95. Id. at 152 n.4.
96. Id.
97. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944), for the earliest articulations of strict scrutiny to evaluate laws that interfere
with fundamental rights or engage in suspect classifications.
98. See, for example, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638–
39 (1943), for an early description of the principles of heightened scrutiny for those Bill of Rights
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theory of heightened scrutiny to protect the political process has not been
entirely ignored: 99 Echoes of the Footnote’s majoritarian concerns are visible
in the emergence of the fundamental right to vote, and the Court’s embrace
of an active judicial role in moderating election law issues. 100
3. Election Law Jurisprudence: Protecting the Rights of Suffrage and
Political Participation
Article 1, Section 4 of the United States Constitution (the “Elections
Clause”) grants state legislatures authority over the time, place, and manner
of congressional elections, subject to congressional oversight. 101
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that the right to vote and to
participate in the political process is a fundamental tenant of representative
government. 102 This principle has been increasingly expressed in terms of
the First Amendment freedoms of association, representation, and
expression—political participatory rights inseparable from the freedom of
speech, 103 and fundamental to the foundations of our democracy. 104
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has applied varying degrees of heightened
scrutiny when a state uses this power to restrict or hinder individual
participation in the political process.105
The Court’s ballot access doctrine is a keen example of this category of
judicial review. The Court first recognized a fundamental right to vote under

provisions incorporated as fundamental, rejecting application of the rational basis test for laws that
address freedom of the press or religion.
99. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969) (finding the
presumption of constitutionality inoperative where state governments have deviated from their
majoritarian mandate).
100. See infra Section II.A.3.
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
102. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000) (finding representative
democracy “unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together [to support] . . . candidates
who espouse their political views”); Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173, 184 (1979) (emphasizing that “voting is of the most fundamental significance under our
constitutional structure”).
103. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (“[P]olitical belief and association constitute the
core of those activities protected by the First Amendment.”); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
460 (1958) (“[F]reedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of . . . freedom of speech.”).
104. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“Speech is an
essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.”);
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (affirming that the First Amendment, as a
fundamental tenant of American government, reflects a “profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”).
105. E.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969) (overturning
restriction on participation in school board elections); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
666 (1966) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down poll tax as unconstitutional).
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the Equal Protection Clause in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 106
characterizing the franchise as “preservative of other basic civil and political
rights.” 107 Since Harper, the Court has consistently applied strict scrutiny to
overturn ballot access restrictions 108 or laws that limit participation in party
primary elections. 109 Comparatively, evenhanded election regulations are
measured through a balancing test articulated in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 110
considering: (1) “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments,” (2) “the precise
interests put forward by the State,” and (3) “the extent to which those interests
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” 111 These laws are often
upheld if the burden imposed is justified by the state’s compelling interest in
preserving the integrity of the election process—and overturned where they
effect an exclusion of candidates or voters from public participation. 112
The same First Amendment principles that preclude ballot access
restrictions also dictate heightened scrutiny of laws that discriminate on the
basis of political belief. 113 Government acts that “disfavor certain subjects
or viewpoints” or “identif[y] certain preferred speakers” are heavily

106. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
107. Id. at 667 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964)); see also Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (declaring the franchise “a fundamental political right, because
preservative of all rights”).
108. E.g., Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 186–87 (1979)
(applying strict scrutiny to overturn requirement that candidates obtain 25,000 signatures); Harper
v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (applying heightened scrutiny to strike down poll
tax law).
109. Political primaries have come to be recognized as “an integral part of the election
machinery,” and are afforded similar protections to general elections. See United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941). For example, in the now-infamous “White Primary” cases, the Court
used the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to strike down laws creating race-based restrictions
on Texas Democratic Party primaries. See generally Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536 (1927).
110. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
111. Id. at 789; see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968) (finding the First
Amendment protects “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs,
and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes
effectively”).
112. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n. 9. Compare Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S.
181, 191, 204 (2008) (upholding Indiana voter ID requirement based on state’s interest in preventing
voter fraud), with Williams, 393 U.S. at 25 (overturning election law that made it “virtually
impossible” for a new political party to be placed on the ballot).
113. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“[T]he First
Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints”); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The government must abstain from
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker
is the rationale for the restriction.”); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976) (“The cost of the
practice of patronage is the restraint it places on freedoms of belief and association.”).
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disfavored, 114 as political speech “is an essential mechanism of democracy”
and “a precondition to enlightened self-government.” 115 These concerns are
manifest in the political arena, where First Amendment freedoms are “at their
zenith.” 116 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has overturned regulations that
limit individual campaign contributions,117 constrain a party’s freedom over
its organizational structure, 118 or frustrate the effectiveness of political
speech. 119 Similarly, the Court has held that any invidious consideration of
partisan loyalty in government patronage decisions amounts to “coerced
belief,” and a violation of the freedom of association.120 These rulings have
been justified by a need to preserve “[t]he free functioning of the electoral
process,” and to avoid conflating the priorities of a political party with the
interests of the government itself. 121
B. The Supreme Court’s Redistricting Jurisprudence
The Elections Clause grants state legislatures the authority to regulate
federal elections, and commits oversight of this process to Congress. 122
Throughout the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court interpreted this
language to hold that redistricting challenges are nonjusticiable, reasoning
that the States have exclusive discretion over the distribution of electoral
power between their political subdivisions. 123 Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the majority in Colegrove v. Green, 124 famously described the apportionment

114. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
115. Id. at 339.
116. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988); accord Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (noting that the First Amendment “‘has its fullest and most urgent
application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office’” (internal citation omitted)).
117. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319 (overturning corporate campaign finance limits).
118. E.g., Eu, 489 U.S. at 222, 229 (finding restrictions on party organization and internal
processes “directly implicate the associational rights of political parties and their members”).
119. E.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 489–90 (2014) (finding it “no answer to say that
[anti-abortion protesters] can still be seen and heard” when government-imposed buffer zones “have
effectively stifled [their] message”); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 736, 738 (2008)
(holding that an election law supporting underfunded opponents of well-financed candidates
“impermissibly burdens [a well-financed candidate’s] First Amendment right to spend his own
money for campaign speech”).
120. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355–56 (1976).
121. Id. at 355–56, 362.
122. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
123. See South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950) (declining to involve the judiciary in
“political issues arising from a state’s geographical distribution of electoral strength”); MacDougall
v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948) (finding states have the prerogative to “assure a proper diffusion
of political initiative” among their political subdivisions); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554
(1946) (finding “the Constitution has conferred upon Congress exclusive authority to secure fair
representation by the States” and therefore “precludes judicial correction”).
124. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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process as a “political thicket” beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 125
This attitude changed following Baker, when the Court held that none of the
formulations of a political question are present in a redistricting suit. 126 In
the subsequent decades, the Court began to develop principles under the
Equal Protection Clause to evaluate the fairness of district maps. 127 Section
II.B.1 explores the evolution of judicially manageable standards for cases
involving malapportionment and racial gerrymandering. 128 Section II.B.2
reviews the Court’s struggle to develop a corresponding framework for
partisan gerrymandering claims. 129
1.

Equal Protection Standards: Equal Population and Racial
Gerrymandering

Following Baker, the Supreme Court has developed two clear standards
for evaluating Congressional districts under the Fourteenth Amendment. 130
First, as a constitutional minimum, equal population—or “one person, one
vote”—must be the legislature’s controlling consideration in the redistricting
process. 131 Although mathematical precision is neither expected nor
required, departures from equal population must be justified by “legitimate
considerations incident to . . . a rational state policy”—such as respect for
established municipal boundaries, the preservation of existing districts, or
principles of compactness and contiguity. 132 Even minimal deviations,
unless unavoidable, require justification, 133 and substantial differences in
population may raise a presumption that a map was drawn with
unconstitutional motives.134

125. Id. at 556.
126. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962); see also supra Section II.A.3.
127. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557 (1964) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause provides
discoverable and manageable standards for use by lower courts in determining the constitutionality
of a state legislative apportionment scheme . . . .”).
128. See infra Section II.B.1.
129. See infra Section II.B.2.
130. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993) (“[Redistricting] schemes violate the
Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect
of diluting minority voting strength.”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (“[A]s nearly
as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”).
131. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558, 581; Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct.
1257, 1270–71 (2015) (emphasizing the constitutional nature of this requirement; calling equal
population “a background rule against which redistricting takes place”).
132. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577, 578–81.
133. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531
(1969) (finding “the command of Art. I, § 2 . . . permits only the limited population variances which
are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is
shown”).
134. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973) (noting “population deviations among
districts may be sufficiently large to require justification”).
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This requirement, now a bedrock principle of the redistricting process,
is grounded in the right to vote. 135 In Wesberry v. Sanders 136 and Reynolds
v. Sims, 137 the Court held Article I, Section 2, 138 construed in light of the
structural design of the bicameral legislature, demands “equal representation
in the House for equal numbers of people.” 139 Districts drawn without equal
population violate this guarantee by distorting the proportionate influence of
each voter. 140 This differential weighing of votes based on geographical
location amounts to a form of discrimination that offends the basic mandate
of Equal Protection. 141 Notably, Justice Harlan dissented from each of these
decisions on political question grounds, arguing that the Elections Clause
grants Congress exclusive oversight of the apportionment process. 142
Rejecting Justice Harlan’s proposition, the Court held that Congress cannot
insulate a constitutional injury from review. 143
Second, the Court has categorically precluded the invidious
consideration of race in the redistricting process. 144 Although a legislature
engaged in redistricting will inevitably be aware of racial demographics, 145 a
congressional map will be subject to strict scrutiny if racial considerations
were the “overriding, predominant force”—the “dominant and controlling
rationale”—in the apportionment process. 146 Although compliance with the
Voting Rights Act and remedial classifications to correct past racial

135. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561–62 (“[S]ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement
of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”); see also supra
notes 106–109 and accompanying text.
136. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
137. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (mandating representatives be chosen “by the People of the several
States . . . according to their respective Numbers”).
139. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 14.
140. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 563.
141. Id.
142. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing “[t]hese decisions . . . have the
effect of placing basic aspects of state political systems under the pervasive overlordship of the
federal judiciary”); Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 23 (Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. supra note 101 and
accompanying text.
143. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 582, 585 (“[O]nce a State’s legislative apportionment scheme has
been found to be unconstitutional, it would be the unusual case in which a court would be justified
in not taking appropriate action . . . .”).
144. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911, 915 (1995).
145. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) (“[R]edistricting differs from other kinds of state
decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines. . . . That
sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination.”).
146. Miller, 515 U.S. at 909, 913, 916 (citation omitted) (finding racial gerrymander where “the
legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial considerations”).
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gerrymanders may allow a race-conscious map to survive strict scrutiny, 147
courts repeatedly strike down districts designed to dilute the representation
of a racial group. 148 Consistent with standard equal protection jurisprudence,
facially neutral districts that are “unexplainable on grounds other than
race”—such as those with extraordinarily bizarre shapes—raise a
presumption of improper motive. 149
The difficulty of ascertaining predominant intent has been a consistent
barrier to redress, especially when the mapmakers indicate a mixed or
alternative motive. 150 This problem is best illustrated by the line of cases
addressing North Carolina’s Twelfth Congressional District. 151 In Shaw v.
Reno (“Shaw I”) 152 and Shaw v. Hunt (“Shaw II”), 153 the first two decisions
addressing this issue, the Court struck down the district as an unconstitutional
racial gerrymander. 154 The Court found that the district’s irregular shape,
juxtaposed against its history and demographics, supported a conclusion that
the map was deliberately drawn to create “two majority-black districts.” 155
When the map was redrawn and subsequently challenged, the plaintiffs were
unable to establish predominant intent, as the new map corresponded evenly
with racial and partisan considerations. 156 Nevertheless, the Court has been
careful to avoid conflating race and party: Although the predominant intent
to obtain partisan advantage provides a shield against racial gerrymandering

147. See North Carolina v. Covington, 138 S. Ct. 2548, 2554 (2018) (upholding adoption of
special master’s “expressly race-conscious” redistricting plan that was “limited to ensuring that the
plaintiffs were relieved of the burden of voting in racially gerrymandered legislative districts”);
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986) (finding majority-minority districts must be
maintained under the Voting Rights Act if (1) the minority group is “sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority;” (2) the minority group is “politically cohesive;”
and (3) the majority “votes sufficiently as a bloc . . . to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate”).
148. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642.
149. Id. at 643, 649; e.g., Goumillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960) (enjoining a
redistricting law converting square-shaped district into “an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure”).
150. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257–58 (2001) (discussing the burden placed on
plaintiffs to demonstrate predominant intent).
151. See generally Easley, 532 U.S. 234 (involving a decade of continuous litigation over
whether the Twelfth District is a racial gerrymander in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Shaw, 509 U.S. 630.
152. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
153. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
154. Id. at 906 (reaching this conclusion under Miller).
155. Id. at 905–906.
156. Easley, 532 U.S. at 258 (finding plaintiffs failed to show “that the legislature could have
achieved its legitimate political objectives in alternate ways that are comparably consistent with
traditional districting principles”); Hunt, 526 U.S. at 549–51 (reviewing expert’s testimony “that
the data as a whole supported a political explanation at least as well as, and somewhat better than,
a racial explanation”).
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claims, use of racial demographics as a proxy for partisan alignment remains
impermissible. 157
2. Partisan Gerrymandering in the Supreme Court: Struggle to
Develop a Standard
Despite the emergence of coherent standards for race and population,
the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate a consistent approach to
partisan gerrymandering. 158 In Gaffney v. Cummings, 159 decided eleven years
after Baker, the Court rejected a challenge to a redistricting plan drafted to
promote proportional representation for the two major parties. 160 Reasoning
that “districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political
consequences,” the Court concluded that the legislature’s consideration of
partisan interests is a necessary incident of the apportionment process. 161
Moreover, the Court found no authority to overturn a plan that “undertakes,
not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but
to . . . provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the legislative
halls of the State.” 162
Although the Gaffney Court was arguably advancing a benign
classification theory for redistricting, 163 subsequent decisions citing Gaffney
have embellished on this principle, culminating in the proposition that “a
jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering.” 164
Accordingly, the challenge lies in determining how much partisan impact
may be tolerated—and defining the boundary between permissible partisan
advantage and unconstitutional partisan entrenchment. 165

157. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 968 (1996).
158. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 282, 306 (2004) (describing “[e]ighteen years of
essentially pointless litigation” and the “long record of puzzlement and consternation” faced by
federal courts resolving these claims).
159. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
160. Id. at 738 (“[State] Senate and House districts were structured so that the composition of
both Houses would reflect ‘as closely as possible . . . the actual [statewide] plurality . . . in a given
election.’” (second and third alterations in original)).
161. Id. at 752–53.
162. Id. at 754.
163. See id. (“[J]udicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports fairly to
allocate political power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength . . . .”); accord Vieth,
541 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“A determination that a gerrymander violates the law
must rest on something more than the conclusion that political classifications were applied. It must
rest instead on a conclusion that the classifications, though generally permissible, were applied in
an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.”).
164. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999).
165. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (“[A]n equal protection violation may be
found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity
to influence the political process effectively.”); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306–07 (2004) (Kennedy,
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The Court’s first crack at this problem came in Davis v. Bandemer, 166
featuring a challenge to the district map adopted by Indiana following the
1980 census. 167 The plan, developed with negligible input from Democrats,
granted Republicans fifty-seven percent of legislative seats with only fortyeight percent of the popular vote. 168 Addressing these disparities, the Court
affirmed the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims, finding the
underlying constitutional question comparable to racial gerrymandering as a
dilution of the voting strength of a target demographic. 169 Nevertheless,
harkening to Gaffney’s recognition that political considerations are an
inevitable feature of the districting process, 170 the Court held that an electoral
disadvantage does not necessarily invalidate a constitutional map. 171 Rather,
“unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is
arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of
voters’ influence on the political process as a whole.” 172
This “consistent degradation” test proved exceedingly difficult to
satisfy, and in Vieth v. Jubelirer,173 the Justices repudiated Bandemer and
fractured over the proper standard to apply. 174 Vieth involved a Pennsylvania
map enacted as “a punitive measure” in response to Democratic redistricting
efforts in other states—and calibrated to ensure Republicans received thirteen
of nineteen congressional seats, with only 49.9% of the popular vote. 175
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion drew a stark contrast between race, “a rare
and constitutionally suspect motive,” and partisan advantage, “an ordinary
and lawful motive,” to distinguish the two claims. 176 Echoing Justice
Harlan’s dissents in Reynolds and Wesberry, Justice Scalia emphasized that

J., concurring) (identifying as core obstacles “the lack of comprehensive and neutral principles for
drawing electoral boundaries” and “the absence of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention”).
166. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
167. Id. at 113.
168. Id. at 115; see Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1495 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (noting “[t]he
minority party was wholly excluded from the mapmaking process”), rev’d, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
169. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 124–25 (observing that either claim involves an “identifiable racial
or ethnic group [claiming] an insufficient chance to elect a representative of its choice;” reasoning
“that the claim is submitted by a political group, rather than a racial group, does not distinguish it
in terms of justiciability”).
170. See supra notes 161–164 and accompanying text.
171. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 128–29, 131–32.
172. Id. at 132. The Bandemer Court reasoned such discrimination may occur either as a result
of “continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of
voters of a fair chance to influence the political process.” Id. at 133.
173. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
174. Id. at 282–84.
175. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535–36 (M.D. Pa. 2002), aff’d, 541 U.S. 267
(2004). This plan did not live up to its partisan expectations—in subsequent elections, the map
produced only a narrow 11–10 advantage for Republicans. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 289.
176. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286.
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political gerrymandering was a common practice during colonial times, and
construed the Elections Clause as precluding judicial intervention in the
redistricting process. 177 Accordingly, the plurality held that partisan
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable political questions. 178
Five Justices—in separate opinions—agreed that partisan
gerrymandering is justiciable but could not settle on an acceptable standard
to apply. 179 Although Justice Kennedy was not prepared to find the claim
justiciable under the facts of this case, he was hesitant to categorically
foreclose review of partisan gerrymandering, and expressed hope that a
standard might emerge in the future, possibly under the First Amendment. 180
Dissenting, Justices Breyer and Souter proposed tests intended to delineate
the boundaries of acceptable partisan influence.181 Justice Stevens went
further, challenging the plurality’s acceptance of political advantage as a
permissible redistricting motive. 182 He analogized partisan gerrymandering
to racial gerrymandering as the deliberate electoral suppression of a target
demographic, 183 and a burden on freedom of association. 184 Justice Stevens
asserted that equating the two claims would obviate the difficulty of defining
a threshold of unconstitutionality, and mitigate the plurality’s concerns about
judicial overreach. 185
Justice Kennedy may have been overly optimistic: Following Vieth,
even as the Court continued to recognize that partisan gerrymandering
subverts basic democratic principles, the Justices were unable to settle on a
manageable standard to resolve these claims. 186 In League of United Latin

177. Id. at 274–75; cf. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 23 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(arguing the Elections Clause provides the States with plenary over elections, “subject only to the
[exclusive] supervisory power of Congress”).
178. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306.
179. Id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“First Amendment concerns arise where a State enacts
a law that has the purpose and effect of subjecting a group of voters or their party to disfavored
treatment by reason of their views. In the context of partisan gerrymandering, that means that First
Amendment concerns arise where an apportionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a group
of voters’ representational rights.”).
181. Id. at 347–50 (Souter, J., dissenting) (proposing a five-element test requiring the plaintiff
to show an injury to their party through a departure from traditional redistricting principles); id. at
360 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting a test based on “the unjustified use of political factors to
entrench a minority in power,” measured by a lack of adherence to traditional districting criteria and
by a minority party’s efforts to hold political power (emphasis omitted)).
182. Id. at 324 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 326 (“[I]f the State goes ‘too far’—if it engages in ‘political gerrymandering for
politics’ sake’—it violates the Constitution in the same way as if it undertakes ‘racial
gerrymandering for race’s sake.”).
184. Id. at 324–25 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976)).
185. Id. at 339.
186. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015).
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American Citizens v. Perry, 187 the Court rejected a “sole motivation”
approach, emphasizing the need for plaintiffs to demonstrate unconstitutional
partisan effects. 188 In Gill v. Whitford, 189 the Court passed over a
mathematical “efficiency gap” algorithm designed to calculate each party’s
wasted votes. 190 Concurring Justices in each case highlighted the
associational harms caused by partisan discrimination and argued that
partisan entrenchment should not be a permissible motive for redistricting. 191
These decisions heightened the judiciary’s confusion over the proper
framework to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering, and left the justiciability
of these claims on increasingly unstable grounds. 192
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court in
Rucho v. Common Cause held that partisan gerrymandering is a
nonjusticiable political question. 193 At the outset, the Chief Justice
highlighted the lack of “clear, manageable, and politically neutral” 194
standards for adjudicating these claims without undermining the legitimacy
or neutrality of the federal judiciary. 195 Although partisan gerrymandering is
“incompatible with democratic principles,” 196 any partisan gerrymandering
doctrine would require the courts to distinguish unconstitutional partisan
187. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
188. Id. at 417, 418 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A] successful claim attempting to identify
unconstitutional acts of partisan gerrymandering must do what appellants’ sole-motivation theory
explicitly disavows: show a burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on the complainants’
representational rights.”).
189. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
190. Id. at 1932. Notably, the Gill plaintiffs presented extensive evidence of the process the
Republican mapmakers used to develop, test, and select a map designed to maximize partisan
advantage. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 847–53 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S.
Ct. 1916 (2018). Nevertheless, this claim was dismissed for a lack of standing. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at
1932.
191. Perry, 548 U.S. at 448 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing a partisan desire to dilute a
group’s voting strength is not a legitimate government purpose for redistricting); Whitford, 138 S.
Ct. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring) (arguing “partisan gerrymanders inflict other kinds of
constitutional harm . . . [and] may infringe the First Amendment rights of association held by
parties, other political organizations, and their members”).
192. See supra notes 158, 177–179 (describing the courts’ trend towards nonjusticiability).
193. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019).
194. Id. at 2498 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306–08 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
195. Id. The Court drew heavily on Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Vieth to reason
that “‘[w]ith uncertain limits, intervening courts . . . would risk assuming political, not legal,
responsibility for a process that often produces ill will and distrust.’” Id. (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S.
at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
196. Id. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S.
Ct. 2652, 2677 (2015)); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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entrenchment from permissible partisan advantage. 197 Any attempt at such a
delineation would invariably rest on competing notions of fairness that are
highly subjective and incompatible with judicial neutrality. 198
The Chief Justice reached this conclusion on two primary grounds.
First, the Court held that “federal courts are not equipped to apportion
political power as a matter of fairness, nor is there any basis for concluding
that they were [constitutionally] authorized to do so.” 199 Although partisan
gerrymandering was common prior to Independence, the Framers granted
Congress exclusive supervision over the redistricting process through the
Elections Clause. 200 “At no point was there a suggestion that the federal
courts had a role to play.” 201 Second, the Court reasoned that where
established principles of Equal Protection prohibit racial discrimination in
redistricting, 202 partisan gerrymandering is an amorphous concept subject to
competing definitions, with no clear threshold of unconstitutionality. 203
“Any judicial decision on what is ‘fair’ in this context would be an ‘unmoored
determination’ of the sort characteristic of a political question beyond the
competence of the federal courts.” 204
Evaluating the standards proposed by the dissent and the lower courts,
the Chief Justice concluded that none provided an acceptable or neutral
boundary for adjudication. 205 The First Amendment test embraced by the
lower courts 206 would preclude any consideration of partisan alignment in the
redistricting process—an approach in conflict with the Court’s longstanding
position that such considerations are tolerable and inevitable. 207 The Equal
Protection test invoked by Middle District of North Carolina raised serious
administrability concerns by requiring judges to predict the outcomes of
future elections and determine whether a disproportionate partisan advantage
is likely to persist. 208 Equally unavailing was Justice Kagan’s approach of
using each state’s individual redistricting criteria as a neutral baseline, as

197. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2498–99.
198. See id. at 2500 (“The initial difficulty in settling on a ‘clear, manageable and politically
neutral’ test for fairness is that it is not even clear what fairness looks like in this context.”).
199. Id. at 2499.
200. Id. at 2494–96.
201. Id. at 2496.
202. Id. at 2502.
203. Id. at 2500.
204. Id. (quoting Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)).
205. Id. at 2502.
206. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text (discussing a three-prong test requiring (1)
discriminatory intent, (2) burden on associational or representational rights, and (3) causation).
207. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2504 (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973)); see
supra notes 160–164 and accompanying text.
208. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2503; see also supra note 40.
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“[t]he degree of partisan advantage that the Constitution tolerates should not
turn on criteria offered by the gerrymanderers themselves.” 209
In an extended dissent, Justice Kagan charged partisan mapmakers with
denying citizens “the most fundamental of their constitutional rights: the
rights to participate equally in the political process, to join with others to
advance political beliefs, and to choose their political representatives.” 210
The dissent argued that partisan gerrymandering violates both the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 211 Where the First Amendment protects freedoms
of political belief, association, and representation, partisan gerrymandering
“subject[s] certain voters to ‘disfavored treatment’ . . . precisely because of
‘their voting history [and] their expression of political views.’” 212 Where the
Fourteenth guarantees every citizen an equal opportunity to participate in
elections, “that opportunity ‘can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the
weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free
exercise of the franchise.’” 213
Justice Kagan challenged the majority with abdicating its most
fundamental duty “just when courts across the country . . . have coalesced
around manageable judicial standards to resolve partisan gerrymandering
claims.” 214 Per Justice Kagan, the three-part First Amendment test
enunciated by the courts below would establish clear and manageable
standards for oversight of the apportionment process while avoiding each of
the majority’s principal concerns. 215 The use of a state’s “own political
geography and districting criteria” as a baseline consideration would limit
judicial subjectivity, 216 and advanced computing technology would enable
courts and litigants to accurately quantify a district map’s dilutive effect. 217
Moreover, “the combined inquiry [of predominance and substantiality] used
in these cases set[s] the bar high, so that courts could intervene in the worst
partisan gerrymanders, but no others.” 218

209. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2505.
210. Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 2514.
212. Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
213. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964)).
214. Id. at 2509.
215. Id. at 2516.
216. Id. at 2521 (emphasis omitted).
217. Id. at 2517–18 (discussing one example technique that uses a computer algorithm to
compare the challenged map to thousands of simulated district configurations based on a state’s
neutral districting criteria). “[T]he same technologies and data that today facilitate extreme partisan
gerrymanders also enable courts to discover them, by exposing just how much they dilute votes.”
Id.
218. Id. at 2522.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The holding in Rucho v. Common Cause was the result of the Court’s
decision to frame the gerrymandering problem as a question of impact, rather
than an impermissible legislative motive. This Note proposes that a district
map drawn with the predominant intent to secure partisan advantage violates
the First Amendment as a form of viewpoint discrimination and an injury to
political participatory rights. Section IV.A provides the foundation of this
analysis by highlighting the Court’s duty to protect the democratic process
against obstruction and distortion. 219 Section IV.B challenges the Court’s
longstanding acceptance of partisan advantage as the predominant objective
of the redistricting process. 220 Section IV.C proposes an intent-based First
Amendment standard to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims on a
theory of viewpoint discrimination. 221 Finally, Section IV.D highlights the
inapplicability of the political question doctrine in light of this framework. 222
A. The Duty to Act: The Court’s Responsibility to Preserve the
Framework of Democracy
The regime of heightened scrutiny established in United States v.
Carolene Products demonstrates that the Court has “a role to play” in
moderating extreme partisan gerrymanders. 223 Professor John Hart Ely
described Footnote Four as articulating a “representation-reinforcing” model
of judicial review, 224 characterized by protections for the process of selecting
decisionmakers, rather than specific substantive outcomes. 225 Under this
approach, the Court has a longstanding duty to “clear[] the channels of
political change” 226 by (1) striking down laws that obstruct the representation
of the majority will and (2) regulating the use of power by political insiders

219. See supra Section IV.A.
220. See supra Section IV.B.
221. See supra Section IV.C.
222. See supra Section IV.D.
223. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311–12 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Allegations of unconstitutional bias in apportionment are most serious claims, for we have long
believed that ‘the right to vote’ is one of ‘those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities.’” (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)));
cf. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2019).
224. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 102, 117
(1980). Professor Ely further notes that courts, as neutral decisionmakers removed from the political
process, are uniquely suited to this task. Id. at 88, 102.
225. Id. at 101–02 (emphasizing that this theory of review recognizes “the unacceptability of
the claim that appointed and life-tenured judges are better reflectors of conventional values than
elected representatives, devoting itself instead to policing the mechanisms by which the system
seeks to ensure that our elected representatives will actually represent”).
226. Id. at 105.
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to prevent the suppression of political outsiders. 227 The rights of speech and
suffrage are closely guarded to guarantee unfettered access to the political
process. 228 Likewise, laws that target minorities are constitutionally suspect
not only by virtue of their stigmatic effect, but also their propensity to insulate
those groups from political influence. 229
Decades of election law jurisprudence highlight the importance of the
Court’s responsibility to the framework of democracy. 230 The right to vote
is protected due to its centrality to the democratic process—in Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 231 the Court described
the franchise as “preservative of all other rights.”232 Accordingly, Professor
Ely’s “channels of political change” are the focal point of the Court’s ballot
access and redistricting doctrines. 233 Anderson balancing turns on the value
of election regulations to a functioning democracy: Challenged regulations
are upheld when their contribution to the effectiveness or the integrity of the
election process outweighs the burdens they place on the franchise. 234
Likewise, each of the established redistricting doctrines is designed to protect
political outsiders against electoral disempowerment 235: Malapportionment
is strictly scrutinized as a form of vote dilution and a “debasement” of the

227. Id. at 101, 103.
228. Id. at 105, 117 (arguing “the courts should be heavily involved in reviewing impediments
to free speech, publication, and political association . . . because they are critical to the functioning
of an open and effective democratic process” and that “unblocking stoppages in the democratic
process is what judicial review ought preeminently to be about, and denial of the vote seems the
quintessential stoppage”).
229. Id. at 86–87 (“[W]hat are sometimes characterized as two conflicting American ideals—
the protection of popular government on the one hand, and the protection of minorities from denials
of equal concern and respect on the other—in fact can be understood as arising from a common
duty of representation.”).
230. See supra Section II.A.3.
231. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
232. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
233. ELY, supra note 224, at 105, 117; accord Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793–94
(1983) (“‘The inquiry is whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens “the
availability of political opportunity.”’ . . . [S]uch restrictions threaten to reduce diversity and
competition in the marketplace of ideas.”) (citation omitted) (quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S.
957, 964 (1982)); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 557, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for the
candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right
strike at the heart of representative government.”); see also supra note 223.
234. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789; see supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.
235. Ely, supra note 224, at 117 (emphasizing that the right to vote is “essential to the
democratic process” and “cannot safely be left to our elected representatives, who have an obvious
vested interest in the status quo”).
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franchise, 236 while racial gerrymandering is categorically proscribed as the
political suppression of a discrete and insular minority. 237
Partisan gerrymandering is no less “incompatible with democratic
principles,” and no less deleterious to “the channels of political change.” 238
As Justice Kagan noted in Rucho, the maps drawn in Maryland and North
Carolina “promote[] partisanship above respect for the popular will.” 239
These gerrymanders undermine the majoritarian process by entrenching
insiders in power, and frustrating the ability of outsiders to translate votes
into representation. 240 They render elections noncompetitive and deter public
participation in the democratic process. 241 They generate “a politics of
polarization and dysfunction,” reinforcing a pervasive belief that officials
owe their allegiance to the members of their party—rather than the voting
public. 242 These trends have not escaped judicial notice: The Supreme Court
has consistently denounced gerrymandering as destructive to the foundations
of our democracy. 243 It necessarily follows that the Court has a duty to act.
Instead, the Rucho majority deferred this responsibility by construing
the Elections Clause as an exclusive grant of authority to Congress and the
States. 244 This reasoning, an echo of the “political thicket” criticized by

236. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise
of the franchise.”).
237. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (“When a district obviously is created solely to
effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to
believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their
constituency as a whole.”).
238. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019) (quoting Ariz. State Legislature
v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)); ELY, supra note 224, at 105;
see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
239. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
240. See supra notes 4, 8 and accompanying text.
241. See Hayes & McKee, supra note 8, at 1009; e.g., Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493,
508, 524 (D. Md. 2018) (noting voter turnout among Republicans decreased by as much as sixteen
percent in counties affected by the Democratic gerrymander in Maryland and concluding that
“[m]embers of the Republican Party in the Sixth District . . . were burdened in fundraising,
attracting volunteers, campaigning, and generating interest in voting in an atmosphere of general
confusion and apathy”), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
242. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 331
(2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The parallel danger of a partisan gerrymander is that the
representative will perceive that the people who put her in power are those who drew the map rather
than those who cast ballots . . . .”).
243. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
244. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2496 (“The Framers were aware of electoral districting problems and
considered what to do about them. They settled on a characteristic approach, assigning the issue to
the state legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress.”). Notably, the
majority argues that review of the redistricting process was committed to Congress in the context
of partisan gerrymandering—but not in the context of racial gerrymandering or malapportionment.
Id. at 2495–96. This is a meaningless distinction. There is nothing in the Constitution that suggests
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Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, 245 was soundly repudiated by the Supreme
Court in Baker v. Carr, Wesberry v. Sanders, and Reynolds v. Sims. 246
Moreover, decades of judicial intervention to prevent abuse of the elections
process demonstrate that the Elections Clause is not an absolute barrier to
judicial review. 247 Although elected officials have authority over the time,
place, and manner of elections, 248 the presumption of constitutionality
attendant to their discretion is narrowed when their actions restrict the
unfettered operations of the democratic process. 249 And while “judges have
no license to reallocate political power between the two major political
parties,” 250 courts have an established duty to prevent those parties from
commandeering the machinery of the state.251
B. The Gaffney Gaffe: Rejecting Partisan Gain as the Dominant
Redistricting Motive
Racial and partisan gerrymandering share a common core in their
damaging effects on the majoritarian democratic process. 252 As Justice
Stevens noted in Vieth v. Jubelirer, “the essence of a gerrymander is the same
regardless of whether the group is identified as racial or political.” 253 Each
practice involves the electoral suppression of a specific demographic by
reducing its ability to preserve its interests through the political process. 254
the judiciary may override the mandate of the Elections Clause to review some Equal Protection
violations, but not others. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1985) (“That the
characteristics of the complaining group are not immutable or that the group has not been subject to
the same historical stigma may be relevant to the manner in which the case is adjudicated, but these
differences do not justify a refusal to entertain such a case.”).
245. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946); see supra notes 124–138 and accompanying
text.
246. See supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 101–112 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s evaluation of
election regulations under the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
248. U.S. CONST. art. 1., § 4.
249. ELY, supra note 224, at 117 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S.
621, 628 (1969)); see supra note 92, 101–105 and accompanying text.
250. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019). But see Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (holding that a State’s allocation of political power is “not wholly exempt”
from judicial scrutiny).
251. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (emphasizing that “care must be taken not to
confuse the interest of partisan organizations with governmental interests”).
252. See supra notes 169, 229.
253. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 335 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (noting the distortion of political representation
created by racial gerrymandering); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132–33 (1986) (“In both
contexts, the question is whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to
effectively influence the political process.”); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 754 (finding districts vulnerable
where “racial or political groups have been fenced out of the political process and their voting
strength invidiously minimized”).
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Each practice undermines legislative neutrality and accountability by
reducing the incentives for elected officials to represent political outsiders. 255
And while many of the most pervasive harms caused by racial discrimination
are not present in the partisan context, racial gerrymandering cases have
consistently been decided on political egalitarian grounds. 256 Whether the
target group is defined by its race or its political identity, its representation is
no less diluted by the cracking and packing of votes than by a distortion in
its district’s population or a restriction on its access to the ballot. 257 It follows
that partisan advantage, like racial discrimination, should not be considered
“an ordinary and lawful motive” in the redistricting process.258
Despite these commonalities, the Court has embraced the misguided
notion that “a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political
gerrymandering.” 259 This distinction can be traced to Gaffney v. Cummings,
where the Court held that a benign consideration of partisan interests during
apportionment is constitutionally permissible. 260 Due to the increasingly
broad construction of this holding, 261 redistricting doctrine has splintered:
Partisan gerrymanders are adjudicated based on their effects on subsequent
elections, while racial gerrymanders are strictly scrutinized based on intent
alone. 262 This bifurcation has left the Court to grapple with the “unmoored
determination” of “how much” partisan entrenchment it is willing to
tolerate. 263 In turn, this framing of the issue as a matter of degree led to
decades of confusion over the proper method to adjudicate partisan

255. Compare Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642, 648, with Vieth, 541 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(recognizing the distortion of incentives caused by each form of gerrymandering).
256. See, e.g., the White Primaries, supra note 109; see also Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648 (finding
racial gerrymandering “altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy”);
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43, 98 (1986) (striking down a redistricting plan under the
Voting Rights Act where “the political processes leading to nomination or election . . . are not
equally open to participation by members of a [protected class]” (alterations in original)).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 169, 213.
258. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 324–26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the State goes ‘too far’—if it
engages in ‘political gerrymandering for politics’ sake’—it violates the Constitution in the same
way as if it undertakes ‘racial gerrymandering for race’s sake.’”).
259. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2497 (2019) (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526
U.S. 541, 551 (1999) and citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) for this principle).
260. See supra notes 160–161.
261. See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text. Equally striking, the doctrinal evolution
from Gaffney’s benign classification approach to Cromartie’s acceptance of “constitutional political
gerrymandering” arguably emerged in dicta.
Constitutional Validity of Congressional
Redistricting, 82 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2014). The Rucho Court, like the Cromartie Court before it,
exclusively cited racial gerrymandering cases for the broader proposition. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497
(citing Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 551; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 916 (1995); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646).
262. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2496–97 (highlighting the difference between the two claims).
263. Id. at 2500–01; see supra note 204.
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gerrymandering claims, 264 and culminated in the political question holding in
Rucho. 265
The divergence of these standards was—and continues to be—grounded
in structural logic incongruous with our constitutional system. 266 In Gaffney,
the Court reasoned that “districting inevitably has and is intended to have
substantial political consequences” as “politics and political considerations
are inseparable from districting and apportionment.” 267 Stated more plainly
in Rucho: “To hold that legislators cannot take partisan interests into account
when drawing district lines would essentially countermand the Framers’
decision to entrust districting to political entities.” 268 This “boys-will-beboys” line of reasoning undermines the system of checks and balances that is
central to the structure of our government. 269 It contradicts the majority’s
stated hesitation to allow politically-motivated actors to moderate their selfinterest. 270 And it misrepresents the intent of the Framers, many of whom
detested partisan gerrymandering, 271 and considered factionalism an
existential threat to the system they designed. 272
The majority’s administrability concerns fare no better. As the Court
has already acknowledged, every legislature will inevitably be aware of race

264. See supra Section II.B.2.
265. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497 (“Partisan gerrymandering claims have proved far more difficult
to adjudicate. The basic reason is that, while it is illegal for a jurisdiction to depart from the oneperson, one-vote rule, or to engage in racial discrimination in districting, ‘a jurisdiction may engage
in constitutional political gerrymandering.’” (quoting Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 551, and citing
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973)); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 128, 132
(1986) (drawing from Gaffney’s benign classification approach and its holding on the inevitability
of partisan effects to reason that “the mere lack of proportional representation will not be sufficient
to prove unconstitutional discrimination” and hold that proving such discrimination requires a
showing of consistent degradation).
266. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
267. 412 U.S. at 753.
268. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497.
269. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (“Ambition must
be made to counteract ambition . . . . In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”).
270. See supra text accompanying note 209; accord Ely, supra note 224 at 117 (emphasizing
that the duty to preserve the democratic process “cannot safely be left to our elected representatives,
who have an obvious vested interest in the status quo”).
271. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[P]artisan gerrymandering goes back to
the Republic’s earliest days. (As does vociferous opposition to it.)”); accord Common Cause v.
Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 844–45 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (reviewing commentary on founding era
authority to confirm public distaste for gerrymandering), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); Khomina,
supra note 6.
272. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton) (characterizing the Union as “a barrier
against domestic faction and insurrection”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (“When a
majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government . . . enables it to sacrifice to its
ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.”).
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during the apportionment process, just as it will be aware of the state’s
political composition. 273 Moreover, redistricting will inevitably affect racial
demographics as readily as political parties. 274 These inevitabilities have not
rendered racial gerrymandering unmanageable: The Court simply chose a
better path for these claims by identifying predominant intent as the threshold
of unconstitutionality. 275 The same approach would be well-suited to address
partisan gerrymandering. 276 Some partisan considerations and political
effects are an inevitable consequence of the redistricting process and must be
tolerated. 277 Once the intent to obtain partisan advantage predominates—
once all neutral considerations have been subordinated to partisan ends—a
constitutional line has been crossed, and the Court must intervene. 278
C. This Much Is Too Much: Partisan Gerrymandering as a Form of
Viewpoint Discrimination
The First Amendment would provide a stronger foundation for partisan
gerrymandering claims. 279 The freedoms of association and representation

273. Compare supra note 145 (discussing inevitable awareness of race), with supra notes 161,
207 and accompanying text (discussing inevitable awareness of political effects).
274. E.g., Olga Pierce & Kate Rabinowitz, “Partisan” Gerrymandering Is Still About Race,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 9, 2017, 6:48 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/partisangerrymandering-is-still-about-race (“Manipulating a map to move around Wisconsin Democrats
also means manipulating a map to move around Wisconsin voters who are not white . . . .”).
275. See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text.
276. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 339 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I would apply
the standard set forth in the Shaw cases and ask whether the legislature allowed partisan
considerations to dominate and control the lines drawn . . . . Such a narrow test would cover only a
few meritorious claims, but it would preclude extreme abuses . . . .”).
277. See supra text accompanying note 267.
278. See supra note 276. Compare Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (finding that to
prove predominance “a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral
districting principles . . . to racial considerations”), with Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484,
2520–21 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (finding “the quest for partisan gain made the State[s]
override [their] own political geography and districting criteria” (emphasis omitted)).
279. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 324 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“‘[P]olitical belief and association
constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment,’ and discriminatory
governmental decisions that burden fundamental First Amendment interests are subject to strict
scrutiny.” (citation omitted) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976))); supra note 111
and accompanying text (discussing connection between voting and speech); see also Simon Brewer,
Back to Basics: Why Partisan Gerrymandering Violates the First Amendment, YALE LAW SCH.,
MEDIA FREEDOM & INFO. ACCESS CLINIC (Mar. 12, 2019), https://law.yale.edu/mfia/casedisclosed/back-basics-why-partisan-gerrymandering-violates-first-amendment
(“The
First
Amendment is the appropriate constitutional provision through which to evaluate partisan
gerrymandering because, quite simply, voting is political speech and partisan gerrymanders attempt
to burden that speech.”).
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are vital to “the channels of political change” 280—already these protections
have been extended to encompass the right to vote and its ancillary political
activities. 281 These political participatory rights are directly undermined by
partisan gerrymandering, which may be characterized as a form of viewpoint
discrimination based on political belief. 282 Accordingly, the possibility of a
First Amendment standard has been a persistent undercurrent in the Supreme
Court’s partisan gerrymandering decisions. 283 Recharacterizing partisan
gerrymandering in this context would align with the Court’s responsibility to
the democratic process, 284 harmonize the racial and partisan gerrymandering
doctrines, 285 and draw a clear constitutional line to provide the foundation of
a judicially manageable standard. 286
The three-part test embraced in Common Cause v. Rucho and Lamone
v. Benisek fails to address the underlying issue. 287 By continuing to measure
the constitutionality of partisan gerrymanders based on their effects, this test
retains the Gaffney bifurcation and all of its attendant line-drawing
problems. 288 The threshold determination that vote dilution must occur “to
such a degree that it result[s] in a tangible and concrete adverse effect”289 is
no less subjective than the unmanageable “persistent degradation” standard
adopted in Davis v. Bandemer and rejected in Vieth v. Jubelirer. 290 While
modern technology can facilitate an objective comparison to a state’s
traditional redistricting criteria, 291 judges would nonetheless be required to

280. ELY, supra note 224, at 105–06 (highlighting the centrality of First Amendment political
participatory rights to a functioning democratic process); see supra notes 103–104 and
accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.
282. See Brewer, supra note 279 (“The Constitution forbids viewpoint discrimination because
it distorts the relationship between citizens and their elected officials.”); accord Rucho v. Common
Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2514 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“By diluting the votes of certain
citizens, the State frustrates their efforts to translate those affiliations into political effectiveness.”);
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]hese allegations involve the First Amendment
interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral process,
their voting history, their association with a political party, or their expression of political views.”).
283. See supra notes 180, 191.
284. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 258, 276 and accompanying text.
286. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct at 2521–22 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (offering “a first-cut answer: This
much is too much”).
287. See supra text accompanying notes 40–43.
288. See supra Section IV.B.
289. Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 515 (D. Md. 2018), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484
(2019).
290. Cf. supra notes 173–178 and accompanying text (discussing Bandemer).
291. See supra notes 190, 217 and accompanying text; accord Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2517 (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (observing that the evidence presented by the North Carolina and Maryland plaintiffs
demonstrates “how the same technologies and data that today facilitate extreme partisan
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make an “unmoored determination” about the impact a map will have on
future elections. 292 More fundamentally, allowing partisan interests to
dominate the redistricting process absent extreme adverse effects would do
little to mitigate the harmful impact of these gerrymanders on “the channels
of political change”—from the distortion, ossification, and polarization of
legislative politics to the breakdown of incentives for lawmakers to represent
their voters. 293
Given the harms produced by these gerrymanders, Carolene Products
demands more. 294 Our democracy demands more. 295 Justice Stevens,
dissenting in Vieth, had the right approach: equalizing the racial and partisan
gerrymandering doctrines by applying strict scrutiny whenever either
impermissible motive predominates. 296 The First Amendment already
prohibits viewpoint discrimination in many official contexts, from campaign
finance, to political patronage, to party organization and advocacy. 297 There
is no reason why this essential protection for the rights of political belief and
association should be blind to this fundamentally political arena. 298 Partisan
gerrymanders frustrate and hinder the effectiveness of individual votes—the
most important form of political expression 299—and chill essential political
activities at the heart of these freedoms. 300 Moreover, the policy concerns
that prohibit consideration of partisanship in patronage terminations are
particularly resonant here, as partisan gerrymandering directly subordinates
the interests of the state to partisan gain. 301
Therefore, the Court should hold that a district map drawn with the
predominant intent to maximize partisan advantage is a violation of the First

gerrymanders also enable courts to discover them, by exposing just how much they dilute votes”
(citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312–13 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
292. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500; see supra text accompanying note 204.
293. ELY, supra note 224, at 105; see supra notes 239–242 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
295. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2519 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“By substantially diluting the votes
of citizens favoring their rivals, the politicians of one party had succeeded in entrenching themselves
in office. They had beat democracy.”).
296. . Vieth, 541 U.S. at 326–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
297. See supra notes 119–127.
298. Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 928 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (noting that“[i]t
defies reason that the First Amendment—which ‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to
political speech” would provide greater protections to “associations of individuals organized
principally for economic gain” than to “associations of individuals principally organized to advance
political beliefs”), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
299. See supra note 111.
300. See supra notes 239–242 and accompanying text.
301. Compare text accompanying note 121 (observing the Court’s invocation of this policy in
political patronage cases) with text accompanying note 242 (discussing how gerrymandering
encourages elected officials to value party loyalty over loyalty to their electorate).
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Amendment. 302 This ruling would confer several benefits and mitigate the
Rucho Court’s concerns. First, a standard grounded in intent alone would
ameliorate partisan gerrymandering doctrine’s persistent line-drawing
problems. 303 Although any evaluation of legislative intent entails some
subjectivity, judges would no longer be expected to predict the effects of a
map on future elections—the courts would be freed of the impossible
quantification of fairness that comes with the question: “How much is too
much?” 304 Second, this ruling would reciprocally strengthen racial
gerrymandering doctrine, as rampant partisan interests have provided
lawmakers with a consistent shield against racial gerrymandering claims. 305
Finally, the inherent difficulty of demonstrating predominant intent would
alleviate the majority’s concerns about overreach.306 Plaintiffs will bear the
burden of proving that all neutral criteria were subordinated to partisan
ends: 307 the extensive evidentiary records compiled in Benisek and Common
Cause demonstrate that this is not an easy task. 308
With predominant intent as the core constitutional inquiry, the canonical
gerrymandering cases can be readily synthetized into a standard to adjudicate
these claims. 309 As in Benisek and Common Cause, courts may have access
to unambiguous statements by the lawmakers responsible for redistricting, or
hard data demonstrating that partisan interests were at the forefront of the
redistricting process. 310 Evidence that the majority party distorted the
302. See supra note 276.
303. See supra Section IV.C.
304. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2501 (2019); accord supra notes 165, 265 and
accompanying text (discussing the bifurcation’s effect in muddying the doctrine and contributing to
the Rucho holding).
305. See supra notes 150–157 (discussing difficulty of adjudicating racial gerrymandering
claims when lawmakers demonstrate mixed motives); accord Igor Derysh, Gerrymander Guru’s
Secret Files: He Used Racial Data to Disenfranchise Black Voters, SALON (Sept. 11, 2019, 10:00
AM), https://www.salon.com/2019/09/11/gerrymander-gurus-secret-files-he-used-racial-data-todisenfranchise-black-voters/ (describing how a Republican mapmaker in North Carolina secretly
used racial demographics to develop the maps at issue in Rucho).
306. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2522 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he combined inquiry used in these
cases set the bar high, so that courts could intervene in the worst partisan gerrymanders, but no
others.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 284–85 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (noting the difficulties
associated with determining partisan motive).
307. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (discussing standard for predominance).
308. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2517–19 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (recounting the “overwhelming”
direct evidence of predominant purpose established by the lower courts); see supra notes 44–45
(summarizing this evidence).
309. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 321–22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“With purpose as the ultimate
inquiry, other considerations have supplied ready standards for testing the lawfulness of a
gerrymander.”).
310. E.g., Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 847–53 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (noting heavy use
of voter data and overriding prioritization of partisan gain in spreadsheets used during the map
drafting process; observing mapmaker’s testimony that “[w]e have an opportunity and an obligation
to draw these maps that Republicans haven’t had in decades”), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018);
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apportionment process by redistricting behind closed doors, privately hiring
and consulting with a partisan firm, or excluding the minority party from
redistricting deliberations is remarkably common, and highly persuasive. 311
Alternatively, the circumstantial evidence standards embraced in racial
gerrymandering cases are readily applicable to partisan claims—such as
bizarre shapes that mark substantial departures from a state’s traditional
redistricting criteria. 312 Likewise, while disproportionate representation is
insufficient in isolation, extreme disparities and flipped results may lend
weight to this analysis. 313
D. Ducking the Question: Refuting the Supreme Court’s Application of
the Political Question Doctrine
Properly characterized as a violation of First Amendment political
participatory rights, 314 partisan gerrymandering is necessarily justiciable. 315
Although political question has been read as a largely prudential mechanism
of abstention, 316 the doctrine is best construed as an exercise of constitutional

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 116 n.5 (1986) (noting mapmakers intended “to save as many
incumbent Republicans as possible”); see supra notes 29–30, 36, 44 and accompanying text
(reviewing legislative testimony and data used in Benisek and Common Cause).
311. E.g., Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 847–53 (describing in great detail the process used by
expert consultants to calculate partisan performance of potential maps and strategically select the
strongest alternative); Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535 (M.D. Penn. 2002) (noting
Republicans developed a map under pressure from national party officials as a “punitive measure
against Democrats . . . effectively ignor[ing] all Democratic members of the General Assembly”),
aff’d, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1495 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (observing
that Republicans hired a private firm to develop the challenged map, excluded Democrats from
mapmaking process, and revealed the proposed map to Democrats in the final hours of the
legislative session), rev’d, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); see supra notes 28, 37 and accompanying text
(describing similar incidents in Benisek and Common Cause).
312. Compare Goumillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960) (finding “uncouth twentyeight-sided figure” demonstrative of racial discrimination), with Bandemer, 603 F. Supp. at 1493
(observing that challenged plan “is replete with ‘uncouth’ and ‘bizarre’ configurations” that suggest
partisan motive). See also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 340 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting one district “looms like a dragon descending on Philadelphia from the west”); Fleming,
supra note 8 (comparing Maryland district to a “praying mantis”); Ella Nilsen, North Carolina’s
Extreme Gerrymandering Could Save the House Republican Majority, VOX (May 8, 2018, 11:00
AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/5/8/17271766/north-carolinagerrymandering-2018-midterms-partisan-redistricting/ (comparing North Carolina districts to “an
octopus” and a “mutant crab”).
313. E.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 411 (2006) (observing
that Republicans carried 59% of the popular vote but won only 43% of corresponding seats under a
prior map); Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 853 (noting that Republicans won 48.6% of the popular
vote and received 60% of the available seats).
314. See supra Section IV.C.
315. See supra notes 80, 143, and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text; see also Ron Parker, Is The Political
Question Doctrine Jurisdictional or Prudential?, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 255, 255, 272–74 (2016)
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interpretation, aimed at defining the limits of textually committed political
This approach reflects the doctrine’s origins as an
discretion. 317
implementation of the separation of powers. 318 From this perspective, the
prudential Baker factors chiefly inform the core question of whether a
constitutional commitment is exclusive—they are not intended to be raised
on a standalone basis to defer judicial review. 319 Moreover, these prudential
considerations share a common nucleus with the presumption of legislative
constitutionality: Both doctrines are a manifestation of judicial respect for the
majoritarian process. 320 Where “the channels of political change” have been
distorted or undermined, that deference has no applicability, and the balance
shifts in favor of intervention. 321
As a function of the separation of powers, the political question doctrine
has no force when the Constitution has been violated.322 Any determination
that a case presents a nonjusticiable political question rests on deference to
the policymaking authority of a coordinate branch of government. 323 The
scope of this authority is constrained by the Constitution: Any political actor
that violates a constitutional provision has abused its discretion. 324 From
Marbury v. Madison to Baker v. Carr, this distinction—between a valid
exercise of policymaking authority and the invalid contravention of
(arguing, largely on surplusage grounds, that only the first Baker factor is constitutional, while the
remaining six are independent prudential considerations).
317. Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. J. 597, 601–06
(1976); accord Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1976) (declining to find a political question
and holding “our determination of the limits on state executive power contained in the
Constitution is in proper keeping with our primary responsibility of interpreting that document”);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been
committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch
exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court . . . .”).
318. See supra text accompanying note 76.
319. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text (demonstrating this pattern).
320. Compare supra note 62 and accompanying text (regarding political question), with supra
note 87 and accompanying text (regarding presumption of constitutionality).
321. ELY, supra note 224, at 105; see also supra Section IV.A.
322. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 226 (holding “[t]he courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit’ a bona
fide controversy as to whether some action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority”
and finding no political question where “[t]he question . . . is the consistency of state action with
the Federal Constitution”).
323. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (highlighting core principle of majoritarian
deference); see also Henkin, supra note 317 at 597–98 (recognizing that this deference is “axiomatic
in a system of constitutional government built on the separation of powers” and arguing that “as
long as the political branches act within their constitutional powers, whether they have done wisely
or well is a ‘political question’ which is not for the courts to consider”).
324. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976) (finding “there can be no impairment of
executive power . . . where actions pursuant to that power are impermissible under the Constitution);
accord Henkin, supra note 317, at 598 (recognizing that the courts’ concern to be “whether the
political branches of government . . . have exceeded constitutional limitations”).
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constitutional norms—has consistently been determinative. 325 Therefore, the
political question analysis inherently requires an exercise of constitutional
interpretation, not judicial abstention. 326 If no violation has occurred, or the
boundary is impossible to discern, the case presents a political question and
judicial restraint will prevail.327 If the line has been crossed and a violation
is clear, there can be no political question. 328
This inquiry does not carve entire issues out of the scope of judicial
review simply because they are difficult to adjudicate with precision. 329 In
Baker, the Court recognized that the political question doctrine is not
amenable to “semantic cataloguing,” as constitutional violations will only be
apparent under the unique circumstances of each case. 330 Therefore, while
the legal issues presented in two cases may be similar, the presence of a
political question will vary on the facts. 331 This piecemeal approach
advances the underlying principles of judicial restraint by encouraging the
Court to draw lines gradually and avoid implicating the separation of
powers. 332 Nowhere is its efficacy more apparent than in the evolution of
redistricting doctrine following Baker. 333 Although the touchstone rules for
malapportionment and racial gerrymandering were declared in decisive
cases, 334 these standards have taken shape over time, their contours fleshed

325. This distinction emerged as early as Marbury, where the Court distinguished the valid
exercise of executive discretion with the President’s defiance of a ministerial duty imposed by
statute or constitutional provision. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. In a modern
context, the distinction is demonstrated by the Court’s deference to the Senate on matters of
impeachment—and its corresponding intervention into the House of Representatives’ attempt to
disqualify duly elected members. Compare supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing Nixon
v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229 (1993)), with supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text
(discussing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)).
326. See Henkin, supra note 317, at 598, 601, 602 n.17 (“[T]he result is an interpretation of the
Constitution, not abstention by the courts on their own initiative from their own institutional
considerations of wisdom and policy or from ad hoc prudential concerns . . . .”).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 81–86.
328. See supra notes 80, 85–86, and accompanying text.
329. But see supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. Regardless, even in the context of the
Guaranty Clause, the Court has typically considered the substance of each case before reaching its
political question determination. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223–24 (1962), for an overview
of these decisions.
330. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
331. Id. at 217–18.
332. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964) (“Developing a body of doctrine on a caseby-case basis appears to us to provide the most satisfactory means of arriving at detailed
constitutional requirements in the area of state legislative apportionment.”); see supra note 89
(discussing this approach in the context of the presumption of constitutionality).
333. See supra Section II.B.2.
334. See supra notes 131, 144, 142, and accompanying text.
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out through the resolution of individual disputes and the confluence of
resultant standards. 335
Therefore, the Court’s determination that partisan gerrymandering
claims are categorically nonjusticiable is fundamentally incompatible with
its concession that partisan gerrymandering is undemocratic 336 and its
recognition that extreme partisan gerrymanders are unconstitutional. 337 This
holding is flatly inconsistent with the doctrine’s origins in Baker, and
deleterious to the balance of restraint and modulation at the core of the
separation of powers. 338
Of course, gerrymandering involves challenging and convoluted issues:
as disputes arise and the standard is tested, courts would find some cases
difficult to decide. 339 But no good doctrine is built in a day—judicial restraint
and stare decisis demand that constitutional rules are developed over time. 340
Accordingly, the possibility of difficult cases should not preclude redress of
clear violations. 341 Rucho would have been a great place to start: In Maryland
and North Carolina, the dominant party’s efforts to curtail “the channels of
political change” were predominant, shameless, and entirely obvious. 342
Instead of skirting around the specter of future disputes, and attempting to
articulate a broad definition of fairness in a single case, 343 the Court should
have done what it has always done: apply a narrow rule to these unambiguous
facts, and let Rucho serve as a clear starting point for the organic evolution
of a workable doctrine.

335. See, e.g., the malapportionment cases, supra notes 130–143.
336. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
337. E.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding
unconstitutionality predicated “on a conclusion that the classifications, though generally
permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative
objective”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (White, J.) (finding unconstitutionality
“where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to
influence the political process effectively”); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973)
(finding unconstitutionality where “racial or political groups have been fenced out of the political
process and their voting strength invidiously minimized”).
338. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
339. See Derysh, supra note 305 (illustrating how Republican redistricting specialists carefully
masked racial discrimination in the North Carolina gerrymanders at issue in Rucho).
340. See, for example, the malapportionment cases, supra notes 131–134 and accompanying
text.
341. See supra notes 80, 143, and accompanying text.
342. ELY, supra note 224, at 105; see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2517 (2019)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (observing the “overwhelming direct evidence” of intent in these cases); see
also supra text accompanying notes 25–39.
343. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499–500 (majority opinion) (arguing “it is not even clear what
fairness looks like in this context.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s political question holding in Rucho v. Common
Cause 344 was the predictable endpoint of decades of confusion over the
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims. 345 But it was also the
foreseeable consequence of the Court’s decision to allow partisan interests to
dominate the redistricting process, and to evaluate gerrymanders based on
their effects, rather than the underlying legislative motive. 346 Instead of
perpetuating this framing, the Court should have drawn the line at
predominant intent, and held that a map drawn to “subordinate adherents of
one political party and entrench a rival party in power” 347 is unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination in its purest form. 348 A First Amendment standard
grounded in intent would ameliorate the confusion that has hindered the
evolution of gerrymandering doctrine, and reclaim the Court’s role as a
steward of “the channels of political change.” 349 Such a standard would be
entirely justiciable, amenable to the wealth of circumstantial evidence
techniques that have been used to evaluate legislative intent for decades. 350
It would be balanced by a predominance threshold well-calibrated to
constrain judicial intervention and preserve the separation of powers. 351 And
it would provide an answer to the Court’s lingering, impossible question:
When asked “how much” partisan entrenchment it is willing to tolerate, the
Court could simply declare: “None at all.” 352

344. See supra Part III.
345. See supra Part II.B.
346. See supra Part IV.B.
347. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015).
348. See supra Part IV.C.
349. ELY, supra note 224, at 105; see supra Part IV.A.
350. See supra notes 308–313 and accompanying text.
351. See supra Part IV.C.; see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2523 (2019)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).

